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Abstract 
Since 1900, the Yoruba people of South-western Nigeria have put its ethnic history at work in 
the construction of its identity in Nigeria. The exercise resulted in the creation of ethno-
nationalist movements and the practice of ethnic politics, often expressed through violent 
attacks on the Nigerian State1 and some ethnic groups in Nigeria. Relying on mythological 
attachment to its traditions and subjective creation of cultural pride, the people created a 
sense of history that established a common interest among different Yoruba sub-groups in 
form of pan-Yoruba interest which forms the basis for the people’s imagination of nation. 
Through this, historical consciousness and socio-political space in which Yoruba people are 
located acted as instrumental forces employed by Yoruba political elites, both at colonial and 
post-colonial periods to demand for increasing access to political and economic resources in 
Nigeria. In form of nationalism, nationalist movements and ethnic politics continued in South-
western Nigeria since 1900, yet without resulting to actual creation of an independent Yoruba 
State up to 2009. Through ethnographic data, the part played by history, tradition and mod-
ernity is examined in this paper. While it is concluded that ethno-nationalist movement and 
ethnic politics in Yoruba society are constructive agenda dated back to pre-colonial period, it 
continues to transform both in structure and function. Thus, Yoruba ethno-nationalist move-
ment and ethnic politics is ambiguous, dynamic and complex, to the extent that it remains a 
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Yoruba Nationalist Movements, Ethnic Politics and Violence: 
A Creation from Historical Consciousness and Socio-political Space 
 in South-western Nigeria 
 
Aderemi Suleiman Ajala1 
Introduction 
In this paper, I deal with ethnic-based nationalism (subsequently refers to as Yoruba 
nationalist movements2), ethnic politics and violence in Yoruba land– an African society 
which is located in the tropical region of South-western Nigeria. As early as 1900s Yoruba 
people had started the creation of ethnic-based nationalist movements firstly as a cultural 
project and by the 1940s the Yoruba nationalist movements assumed a political dimension in 
form of civic nationalism; and between the 1960s to 2009, this involved the use of violence. 
The first intent of this paper is to discuss the development of Yoruba nationalist movements 
within the context of tradition, history and modernity. In the process, other themes such as the 
changing nature of Yoruba (ethnic) nationalist movement, the use of violence in ethno-
nationalist movement and effects of Yoruba nationalist movement on the State actions in 
Nigeria are also detailed.  
Many scholarly works are available on Yoruba identity and politics. Yet bearing in 
mind that group identity and socio-political formation that form the basis for nationalism and 
politics are complex and subject to change, more research is needed on Yoruba identity and 
politics especially on how ethnic-based nationalists shape Yoruba politics and how Yoruba 
nationalist movements have impacted on Nigerian State both at the colonial and post-colonial 
periods. It is particularly so in realization of the ambiguity and controversies characterizing 
Yoruba nationalist movements, and the changes which the movements experienced between 
the 1900s and 2009. Specifically, Yoruba nationalism and politics changed not only in terms 
of its structure but also in its functions. Resting on historical consciousness of the people and 
the socio-political space in which the Yoruba people live in Nigeria – a number of pre-
colonial independent kingdoms (sub-ethnic groups) that was colonized and formed into a 
                                                            
1 I would like to appreciate the valuable, strong, frank and polite comments by Prof. Carola Lentz on my 
research efforts; and that of Eva Spies for her critical comments on the second draft of this particular paper. I 
also thank Prof. Onookome Okome and Thomas Bierschenk for their useful suggestions at the 
Institutskolloquium where I presented the first draft of this paper. Jan Beek and Sarah Fichtner were also very 
helpful in many of our informal discussions on our individual research. As all the opinions raised in this paper 
are entirely mine, I am responsible for any shortcoming that might be noticed in the paper.  
2 I refer to Yoruba nationalism as nationalist movements because it is still in progress and it has not led to the 
creation of an independent Yoruba State. 
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British colonial territory with other ethnic groups around the River Niger area and since 1960 
a member of about 270 ethnic groups forming a post-colonial State calls Nigeria – Yoruba 
nationalism is influenced by the changing nature of the Nigerian society as a whole.  
Formation of group identity and socio-political movements among the Yoruba people 
in the colonial period was different both in form and functions compared with what it was at 
pre-colonial time. At the pre-colonial Yoruba society, the group consciousness was mainly 
created as historical link among the Yoruba people, mostly through the refugees and the Oyo 
migrants of the collapsed Old Oyo Kingdom, who invoked history to construct a political 
hegemony linking several Yoruba sub-groups (Dortmund, 1989; Falola and Genova, 2006), 
with either the political cradle (Oyo) and/or the spiritual cradle (Ile-Ife) of “the Yoruba 
people”3. Apart from Ife and Oyo, the Yoruba subgroups still consist about eighteen other 
subgroups in South-western Nigeria, with another two sub-groups in Republic of Benin and 
Togo. Different Yoruba sub-groups used their sense of common identity as a group to 
establish cultural influence and political power. Each of these different Yoruba sub-groups 
claimed its distinct sub-group identity at the pre-colonial period. During the colonial time, the 
early Yoruba elites mainly Christian clergies created the idea of cultural nationalism in form 
of pan-Yoruba identity initially constructed as a cultural work (Peel, 1989),which was later 
turned into a political project in the post-colonial era by Yoruba colonial political elites – a 
transition that began shortly before the end of British colonialism in Nigeria. It was the 
emphasis on its political imports that led Yoruba politicians to develop the idea of political 
nationalism from the earlier cultural nationalism, which in turn embraced the use of violence 
directed against Nigeria as a State and the Hausa/Fulani4 political group – another major 
ethnic group in Nigeria – whom the Yoruba politicians always perceived as causing socio-
political marginalization against the Yoruba.  
In this paper, following this introductory section, the rest of the paper is divided into 
three main parts. The first part contains both conceptual and the theoretical examinations of 
the terms- nationalism, ethnic politics and nationalist movements in Yoruba land. The 
anchoring concepts are contextualized and discussed theoretically relying on constructivists’ 
theoretical position. The second part discusses the research procedures and some findings that 
                                                            
3 Yoruba as a term is referring to the collection of people in South-western Nigeria is of recent invention dated to 
the early 19th century. 
4 Hausa/Fulani ethnic group is one of the three most populated ethnic groups in Nigeria, located in Northern 
Nigeria. Other two ethnic groups are Yoruba in South-western Nigeria and Igbo in South-eastern Nigeria. Since 
Nigeria independence in 1960, these three ethnic groups have been involved in competition for Nigerian political 
power. 
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are relevant to the theme of this paper. This section apart from discussing the study 
motivation, the data collection and analysis procedures are detailed in such a way that brings 
out the comprehensiveness of the generated data. Also this part of the paper brings to bear the 
working of Yoruba history and traditions into nationalism and the part played by Yoruba 
political elites in the process. The last part of the paper discusses both the dynamics of Yoruba 
nationalist movements and brings out its implications on Nigeria as a State. On the whole the 
paper concludes that ethnic nationalism has spread to other ethnic groups in Nigeria, 
following the example of the Yoruba people of South-western Nigeria, and in effect ethnic 
nationalism continues to undermine the State process of fostering integration and political 
development in Nigeria. 
 
I. Nationalism, ethnic politics and Yoruba nationalist movements 
Conceptual Analysis: Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 
The concept- nationalism emerged from nation and posited in various meanings by various 
scholars. Nation is an “imagined political community” (Anderson, 1983), “a daily plebiscite” 
(Renan, 1990), and “a contested community” (Yewah, 2001) that is sustained not by any 
actual judicial affiliation but by the imagination of its citizens (Young, 2004) who in the 
opinion of Brabazon (2005) must consent to their nationality. Whether a nation is imagined, 
constructed or invented, it is an imagination that is based on a some materiality real enough to 
bind a particular group of people together in an expression of certain commonly expressed 
cultural contents such as imagined space, spiritual link, history, ethnicity, ancestry, language, 
and political aspiration among others. All these homogenized cultural contents bind a group 
or sub-groups of people together to affirm nationhood. 
Because nationalism is defined as loyalty and attachment to the nation (Virtanen, 
2005), it is important that such loyalty and attachment must be expressed above and beyond 
individual differences. It must also be a projection of group identity aiming at declaring the 
group autonomy either in full or in part. Thus, nationalism is often expressed in the contexts 
of history of origin and political development, patri- or matrimonial descent, and cultural 
ethnocentrism commonly shared by a group of people seeing itself as different from others 
within which it jointly exists as a political State. This has being the experience among the 
Quebecois in Canada (Cormier, 2002), the Kurds in Iraq, Turkish and Iranian, Corsicans in 
Spain (Gurr, 2000); the Irish in United Kingdom (Hutchinson, 1987a) and the Eritrea in 
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Ethiopia who had been involved in ethno-nationalism. The above suggests that nationalism is 
the mobilization by a group of people who see themselves as sharing a common identity in 
terms of socio-cultural values such as language, history, tradition and political aspiration 
among others and use such in self- determination towards the creation of its own sovereign 
State. The utmost goal of nationalism therefore is a creation of an autonomous State by a 
group of people bounded together in a common identity. 
While nationalism as a political project has changed the political landscapes of many 
States such as the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Ethiopia, where dissent ethno-
nationalists have broken out to establish their own new Republics; in many other States like 
Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria, aggrieved nationalist movements often 
threatened the collapse of the States through violent agitations. It therefore suggests that 
nationalism is a modern political identity engaged in competition for political sovereignty in 
many heterogeneous States. In the 21st century it is often expressed as resentment against 
perceived marginalization, over-centralization of State power, especially in the newly 
emerging democratic States of sub-Saharan Africa as democracy guarantees political freedom, 
which in many of the post-colonial African societies were initially denied by military 
governments that characterized many of these societies during the last decades of the 20th 
century. The expression of nationalism presents States in sub-Saharan Africa as a terminal 
community and acts as a form of ethnicity employed in creation of a distinct nation (Duruji, 
2008: 89). 
There are two distinctions of nationalism – cultural nationalism and civil nationalism. 
As observed by Hutchinson (1992) Hutchinson and Smith (1994) and Cormier (2000) civic 
nationalism develops claim to political autonomy expressed in form of sovereign State 
(Gellner, 1983; Cormier, 2002) based on common citizenship (Cormier, 2003: 531) created 
among politically homogenous but likely) culturally diverse groups that seek joint autonomy 
from oppressive regimes. Mostly, political actors and legislators often lead civic nationalist 
movements, engaging in political battles through constitutional reforms, political protests, 
formation of indigenous political party systems and political education and sensitizations that 
are institutionally channeled towards declaration of national sovereignty. In other words civic 
nationalism operates as a top-down system in which political leaders employ legal and 
political framework (Cormier, 2003) to mobilize different principal nationalities to claim 
independence from alien government, as was the case of many African post-colonial States 
that started to claim their independence from their former colonies in the late 1950s. Nigeria 
had its independence in 1960 following the use of civic nationalism against British 
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colonialism practiced in Nigeria between 1900 and 1960. Civic nationalism is therefore a 
political project of establishing indigenous statehood and politically sovereign State.  
On the other hand, cultural nationalism rests on linguistic, educational (Hutchinson, 
1987a Barber, 1989), artistic rejuvenation of a cultural community or nation (Hutchinson, 
1992), expression of all forms of ideational and material cultures especially aesthetic values 
that are regarded as the cultural touchstones and prides of a particular cultural groups. As 
noted by Adebanwi (2005) the invention of such cultural pride, rest on the attachment of a 
common descent and aspirations of a set of people owing a strong cultural ties and an interest 
directed towards national sovereignty. This brand of nationalism appeals mostly to cultural 
intellectuals, educators, indigenous clergies, students, journalists and other professionals 
wanting to reassert their distinctive cultural pride against the perceived (already created or 
intended) cultural pride projected, using writing and media as their cultural values. In a way 
cultural nationalism connects together small-scale grassroots (Hutchinson, 1987b) socio-
cultural organizations and associations who engage in struggle for the recognition of their 
cultural heritage and expression of such as preservable cultural pride (Cormier, 2003). As an 
expression of cultural pride, cultural nationalism is often a precursor to civic nationalism. 
However as the distinction between cultural nationalism and civic nationalism is often 
narrow, cultural nationalism can (as in most cases) develop to civic nationalism as often being 
the case in many States where cultural nationalism embraced political activity directed 
towards State autonomy. But in the case where cultural nationalism is not too political to have 
led a group to State autonomy, it is just ethnicity – a convergence between ethnicity which is 
to a large extent cultural and nationalism being political.  
In the context of the Yoruba people of South-western Nigeria, the expression of 
nationalism as we shall see shortly in details is in three phases. The first was in form of 
cultural nationalism based on expression of Yoruba cultural pride and creation of a national 
unity among diverse Yoruba sub-groups that existed in distinct kingdoms or chiefdoms at 
their pre-colonial period. Started from 1880s, the new Yoruba colonial-made intelligentsia 
and clergies created cultural nationalism to establish a common myth of origin, language, 
ideologies, religions and beliefs, craft and popular cultures to establish a pan-Yoruba pride 
and cultural superiority in the colonial Nigeria. At that time till the 1940s, the early Yoruba 
intellectuals and clergies that were involved in cultural nationalism, were not interested in the 
creation of a politically autonomous Yoruba State, rather they were interested in the British 
colonial administrative recognition of their ideational culture mostly the Yoruba language and 
the unity of Yoruba people.  The second was the translation of this cultural pride into a 
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political project by the Yoruba colonial politicians starting from the 1940s in colonial Nigeria. 
It involved an appropriation of the legacies of cultural nationalism to negotiate inclusion in 
colonial government and to gain political control of Nigeria in the subsequent post-colonial 
Nigeria that was emerging since the late 1940s. The Yoruba myth of origin was re-invented to 
bind all Yoruba groups together as a political constituency, with a feeling of collective 
consciousness of being Yoruba (as a pride group) through which a set of “perceived” qualities 
of being better than other ethnic groups in Nigeria was constructed. All of which were 
translated to political actions such as the formation of political parties and socio-cultural 
groups, used in accessing political power and negotiation for political domination in Nigeria. 
The second phase of Yoruba nationalism were series of political movements in form of civic 
nationalism initially rested on fraternal relationship with other ethnic groups that constituted 
colonial Nigeria between 1900 and 1960. Following the marginalization, which the Yoruba 
experienced under the British colonial government and subsequent political suppression, 
which the people perceived it faced in Nigerian post-colonial State, political violence 
characterized the Yoruba post-colonial nationalism. With strong attachment to its 
mythological and “actual”5 power and perceived enlightenment based on the people’s literacy 
capacity, the Yoruba re-created its nationalism with the use of violence since 1964 till 2009 as 
the third phase of its nationalism. However, since Yoruba nationalism has not led to the 
creation of a Yoruba autonomous State, it is referred to as nationalist movements. Nationalist 
movements therefore imply both cultural and political agencies and structures employed by 
Yoruba people of South-western Nigeria to negotiate the political control of its socio-political 
space in both colonial and post-colonial Nigeria. Among these agencies and structures, ethnic 
cultural pride, mythological power, ethnic politics, rhetoric of political marginalization and 
violence are dominant in Yoruba practice of ethno-nationalist movements. 
Ethnic politics is political bargaining that does not transcend a particular ethnic 
boundary (Obi and Okwechime, 2004: 349). The hallmark of ethnic politics is the party 
system that is absolutely based on ethnic affiliation. If a political party is based on the rallying 
symbols, and ideology of a particular ethnic group in a multi ethnic society and the party fails 
to have a national outlook, such political party is based on ethnic politics. As mentioned by 
Babawale (2007: 33) ethnic politics was predominant in Nigeria between 1950s and 1966; 
                                                            
5 The use of actual power here refers to the Yoruba belief that it has more successes in introducing welfare 
programmes that are real aspects of human development in Nigeria. As part of its cultural pride, Yoruba often 
refer to introduction of free primary education, free health care system, establishment of first television station in 
Africa, the unprecedented urbanization and industrialisation in western Nigeria (between 1950s and 1970s), 
which spread to other parts of Nigeria as the Yoruba ingenuity in governance. 
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among the Yoruba between 1979 and 1983; and between 1999 and 2005. Between 1950s and 
1966, the political parties in Nigeria were purely ethnic based as each of the three political 
parties then represented different ethnic interests of the three dominant ethnic groups in 
Nigeria. While Action Group (AG) represented the Yoruba interest in South-western Nigeria, 
the National Congress of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) represented the Igbo interests in Eastern 
Nigeria and Northern People’s Congress (NPC) represented the Hausa/Fulani interests in 
Northern Nigeria. Like other ethnic groups such as the Hausa/Fulani, the Igbo and Ijaw in 
Nigeria that involved in ethno-nationalist movements, the Yoruba post-colonial ethno-
nationalist, ethnic politics and violence contributed in a large scale to the fragility of Nigeria 
as a modern State. 
 
African Ethnicity, Colonialism and Yoruba Nationalist Movements: Theoretical 
Perspectives 
In consideration of nationalism and ethnic politics as elements of ethnicity in Nigeria, it is 
necessary to historicize ethnicity and place Yoruba ethno-nationalist movements in both 
historical and broader perspectives. Through pre-colonial to post-colonial periods, Nigerian 
societies are characterized by three major features that tend to promote ethnicity. The first is 
the expression of cultural and ethnic-based political hegemony among different ethnic groups 
that constituted pre-colonial Nigeria. Before the British colonialism in Nigeria, many ethnic 
groups in Pre-colonial Nigeria existed in Kingdoms with different independent political 
systems appropriated with local political hegemonies. Among the major one are the Hausa-
Fulani in Northern Nigeria, the Igbo in Eastern Nigeria and the Yoruba (Oyo) in South- 
western Nigeria. As often being the case where different politically independent societies are 
contiguously located, usually expression of a superior feeling of a group claiming certain 
physical and cultural characteristics superior to other groups in the same political contiguous 
space is common (Laitin, 1986; Marizu, 1998; Nyuot Yoh, 2005). Such characteristics could 
be cultural pride, ecological features regarded as either economic or political resources; 
historical advantages that are often constructed into social capitals and political influence 
among many others. Often, in heterogeneous societies, where one or more of the 
differentiated groups express hegemony, other groups do not willingly accept such an 
expression, then resulting to ethnic tensions and conflicts (Marizu, 1998). This was the case 
among the three dominant ethnic groups in pre-colonial Nigeria that partly accounted for the 
spread of Fulani Jihad from northern to southern Nigeria, which engaged the Yoruba and 
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Fulani in war in the 1830s. Even at the colonial period the three ethnic groups still held on to 
their differently conceived political hegemony at the expense of Nigerian colonial State, 
albeit, the British colonialism being able to manage the ethnic tensions that were generated, 
yet the feeling of one group being superior to others characterized the colonial political 
relationship among many Nigerian ethnic groups. 
The second feature is the socio-cultural differentiation based on diverse cultural 
identity, political history and contests for space-characteristics that started to manifest among 
different ethnic groups in Nigeria right from the pre-colonial period. According to Barth 
(1956) and Schwarz (1965) the separation of human groups into identifiable and discrete units 
remains complex. As the complexity combines with the dialectics of contests for space, it 
gives certain groups the chance to exert their control over others (Wimmer, 2002; Young, 
2004; Patnaik, 2006). Thus, with the intention of one group wanting to control space, there are 
often tensions and conflicts engaged with others sharing the same space, which may end up 
inflaming group relationship especially in sharply ethnically-differentiated societies. As 
evident in Nigeria, starting from colonial period till the present post-colonial time, there exists 
a sharp socio-cultural differentiation among the ethnic groups that form the Nigerian State. 
Such differentiations are expressed in different cultural and political histories; different 
cultural ideologies and beliefs; as well as different values; aspirations and visions, which 
often develop into ethnic nationalism and ethnic politics.  
The last feature is that ethnicity and nationalism combine as a changing force through 
which freedom and more political and economic resources can be appropriated. Like in many 
other societies where ethnicity has being scholarly examined, Nigerian ethnic groups are 
dynamic and constantly changing as an adaptive response to the changing material demands 
imposed by their changing space (Depress, 1975; Gellner, 1983; Ericksen, 1991; Leroy, 2003; 
Virtanen, 2005). In Nigerian in particular changes experienced by ethnic groups over several 
decades included the regimes of authoritarianism (both colonial and post-colonial forms); 
economic depression; loss of confidence on government and return to democracy. And so 
ethnic groups that perceived themselves as been more affected than others engage nationalism 
and ethnic politics to assert political freedom and negotiating more political and economic 
power. 
From the recent Illife’s discussions (1979) that saw ethnicity as a colonial creation in 
Africa to Nugent (2008) who put history back into the African ethnicity by mapping pre-
colonial ethnicity history among the Madinka/Jola of Senegambia region, it is clear that there 
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are two levels of theoretical discussions on African ethnicity. The first is that African 
ethnicity is a colonial construction made possible by interplay of European interventions of 
colonial administrators, Christian missionaries, colonial employers and early ethnographers 
on one hand and on the other through the agency of local Christian converts, educated elites 
and urban migrants as shown among Tangayika (Illife, 1979); Southern Africa ( Leroy, 1989); 
and in Gambia (Wright, 1999). Emphasizing the exclusive colonial invention of ethnicity in 
Africa, Wright (1999) specifically warned against the danger of reading ethnicity in pre-
colonial African societies, drawing on his study of ethnicity in Gambia. The second school, 
having historicized African ethnicity fished out elements of ethnicity in pre-colonial African 
societies in Kenya (Berman and Lonsdale, 1992); Dagara in Northern Ghana (Lentz, 2006); 
Igbo in South-eastern Nigeria (Harneit- Sievers,2006) and Madinka/Jola in Senegambia 
(Nugent, 2008). Strengthening the constructivists’ idea, the epochal work of John Lonsdale 
(1992 and 1996) first made a distinction between moral ethnicity and political tribalism and 
Spear (2003) in his debate on ethnicity maintained that ethnic concepts (ethnic nationalism 
inclusive), processes and politics predated colonialism especially in African societies. This 
second school puts a deeper historical view on the processes of local construction of ethnicity 
and its elements as against the first school that sees the colonialists as the constructors of 
ethnicity in Africa. Relying on historical details of ethnicity in Africa (Lentz, 2006; Nugent, 
2008) the second school further established that the colonial and post-colonial elements of 
African ethnicity were mere adaptation of the pre-colonial elements that were initially present 
and expressed in many African societies. For instance the creation of some (new) colonial 
elements of ethnicity such as nationalism and new form of patron-clientele politics were re-
creations from African pre-colonial group loyalty and the political influence of many pre-
colonial African kings and chiefs. These elements of ethnicity were used by colonial and pre-
colonial political elites to access political and economic resources. While I developed interest 
in identity politics and nationalism in the midst of these debates and been mentored by a 
strong constructivist of the historical school, as I hold throughout this paper, my orientation 
inclines towards locating elements of ethnicity in pre-colonial Yoruba society, and how such 
elements were adapted and used as instrumental forces by Yoruba political elites as 
instruments of ethno-nationalist movement and politics in both colonial and post-colonial 
periods. 
Ethnicity is essentially a cultural phenomenon, albeit subjective and dynamic against 
nationalism that is political and created, similarly fluid and complex; ethnic identities are 
particular features of a particular group of people created in context of different particular 
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situations. Hence, in Yoruba context, consciousness of sub-group identities, identity 
formation based on distinct language dialects, Yoruba pre-colonial inter-tribal wars for 
political supremacy among various pre-colonial kingdoms (Johnson, 1921; Atanda, 1997) and 
kingship institutions that featured patronage politics (Joseph, 1981) were elements of ethnicity 
in pre-colonial Yoruba society, of which many were adapted into Yoruba colonial and post-
colonial politics. However Yoruba ethno-nationalist movement was created as an element of 
colonial ethnicity. Like in Yoruba society that had a pre-colonial state political system, this is 
particularly similar in the history of ethnicity among Igbo of South-eastern Nigeria (Harneit-
Sievers, 2006) and the Dagara of Northern Ghana (Lentz, 2006) which were pre-colonial 
stateless societies. 
Impliedly on Nigerian State, the foregoing suggests that British colonialism and the 
responses from the early Nigerian educated and political elites created a unique linkage 
between colonial and post-colonial forms of political authoritarianism, patronage and 
clientelism on one hand and on the other, an ethnic fragmentation and political competition 
that already characterized diverse cultural groups in the pre-colonial Nigeria. The continuity 
of these institutions in form of power relations and identities that run through colonial and 
post-colonial periods has shaped the particular character of the State-ethnic group relations 
and politics in Nigeria, which bred prebendal politics (Joseph,1981) and the politics of the 
belly (Osaghae, 2004). These coalesce in ethno-nationalist movements that undermine the 
legitimacy of the State, inhibit the formation of broader trans-ethnic national identities and 
also challenge the current efforts at democratization. 
 
II. Research on Yoruba-nationalism 
Research Methods 
Predominantly, qualitative methods, through both primary and secondary sources, were used 
in the research. Primary data collection involved the use of observation, key informant 
interview  and semi-structured interviews triangulated with survey study employing open-
ended questions. The fieldwork was conducted in Oyo, Osun, Ondo, Ekiti, Kwara, Kogi and 
Ogun states. From each of the selected states, two Yoruba sub-ethnic groups were purposively 
selected. Survey interviews were conducted in Ekiti, Kogi and Oyo states, relying on random 
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sampling of 50% of sample frame of the entire study universe.6 In each of the randomly 
sampled states, two Local Government Areas (LGAs) were purposively selected as the study 
communities, based on the rural and urban divides in each state. Another round of random 
sampling was engaged in selecting the Enumeration Areas (EAs), the Households and the 
respondents for the interview. 
The use of key informant interviews was restricted to Osun, Kwara and Ogun states. 
Some key informants were also located in Lagos state. The study covered all the Yoruba 
speaking states including Kwara and Kogi states, located in the lower Niger (Northern) belt of 
Nigeria and considered as part of Northern Nigeria since 1954. These two states have Yoruba 
people as the dominant population, with 62% and 48% Yorubas in Kwara and Kogi, 
respectively ( National Population Commission, 2006). Their inclusion in the sample provides 
an opportunity to assess both the ecological and demographic trends of Yoruba nationalism 
and their political implications. Map 1 below shows the Yoruba territory where the fieldwork 
was conducted. 
   
Map 1: The Yoruba territory in the 21st century with some of its major towns and cities 
Source: Yoruba Nationalism and Ethnic Study, Ethnographic Study Map, 2007. 
 
                                                            
6 The study universe is the Yoruba society of South-western Nigeria which has six geo-political states out of the 
36 states forming the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
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The selection of Oyo (Ibadan and Oyo groups), Kwara (Ilorin and Offa groups) and 
Ondo (Ondo and Ilaje groups) states for survey study was motivated by a number of factors. 
Ibadan is regarded as the heartbeat of Yoruba politics since its foundation and following its 
appropriation of political superiority from the old Oyo Empire in the 1830s (Falola, 1984). 
During the colonial era, it became the administrative headquarters of the old Western Region. 
In addition, Ibadan is a creation of many Yoruba sub-ethnic groups such as Ijesa, Oyo, Ife, 
Egba, Owu, Ijebu, Igbomina and Ekiti, among others. Hence, a proper ethnographic study of 
Ibadan reflects a micro-study of the Yoruba in South-western Nigeria. Oyo group is regarded 
as the centre of colonial and post-colonial Yoruba nationalist movements because its cultural 
identity and ideologies had dominated Yoruba culture since the late 19th century. The focus 
on Oyo therefore provides both material and ideological evidence on the hegemonisation of 
Oyo culture in the entire Yoruba land as well as revealing the dynamics of its local identity  in 
the 21st century. The selection of Ekiti for in-depth interview was also motivated by the fact 
that Ekiti state provides a case study of local nationalist movements rather than pan-Yoruba 
nationalist movements, as shown in the demand for an Ekiti state between 1983 and 1997. For 
an understanding of the link between local rivalries, Yoruba nationalist movements and 
political violence, Ekiti state provides rich and recent evidence, as the state experienced 
another spate of political violence limked with electoral fraud in 2009.  Also in 1996 at a 
period when most members of the Yoruba political elites refused to be associated with the 
central government in Nigeria, Ekiti leaders successfully lobbied the Nigeria’s ruling clique 
for the creation of an Ekiti state in 1997. Ilorin, being a Muslim-dominated community, 
provides comparative data with Offa, also a Muslim-dominated community in Kwara but with 
different views on Yoruba nationalist movement and politics. These communities are 
compared with Igbomina town of Igbaja in Northern Kwara which is predominantly Christian 
and has more educated people.  
The study relied on observation and key informant interviews due to the need to 
concentrate on individual case studies, while in-depth interviews were designed to establish 
an overview of popular Yoruba perception of nationalism. These methods were 
complemented with the data sourced from archives and media documents. In total, close to 
seven hundred (700) respondents were interviewed throughout the fieldwork sessions that 
lasted betweeen 2003 and 2009. These respondents exhibit characteristics that cut across the 
diverse socio-economic factors such as education, sex, religion, sub-ethnic groups, age, 
income and marital status.  
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Data collection started in 2003 with archival research and literature review, followed 
by key informant interview (KII) beginning from 2004. During the KII, observations of many 
political activities such as meetings and campaigns were conducted. Between 2005 and 2006, 
together with two research assistants, I engaged in survey study7, during which further 
observations were made. In 2006 more data were collected in Lokoja and Kaba in Kogi state. 
Subsequently, as more information tricked in on Yoruba nationalist movements and ethnic 
politics, more data were collected until the early part of 2009.8  
The ethnographic analysis of the generated survey data was done through content and 
semi-quantitative methods. There were 591 survey data scripts from male and female 
respondents of different socio-economic status who gave a detailed account of their views on 
several cultural issues mostly related to politics in South-western Nigeria. As I deeply 
interacted with the respondents and studied the respondents mostly through emersion, cultural 
views, including shared and divisive cultural and political values, political principles and 
realities, religious intersections, ethno-national aspirations, violent ethno-nationalist 
movement and many other secondary views integrally linked with the Yoruba nationalist 
movement and ethnic politics began to emerge. 
As the datasets include the Yoruba perception, attitudes and practices related to ethnic 
politics as an aspect of Yoruba nationalist movements, based on detailed and specific case 
studies of the entire Yoruba speaking people of South-western Nigeria, they present the 
opportunity for a comparative approach and a generalisation of findings. The above research 
design therefore gives insight into how local histories, socio-economic status, ideology 
religion and local rivalry influence the perception of Yoruba culture and politics, and within 
the context of cultural dynamics the understanding of Yoruba nationalist movement becomes 
generally explicit, as shall be shown in the rest of this work. 
                                                            
7 The Survey study involved the use of 600 questionnaire booklets containing open-ended questions distributed 
in Ibadan, Oyo, Ilorin, Offa, Ondo and Igbokoda (Ilaje) towns, with 100 quesionnaires allocated for each of the 
selected towns. Out of these questionnaires only 591 were retrieved for analysis. Systematic sampling involved 
three stages of purposive and random samplings. States where surveys were conducted were purposively 
selected, while the local government areas serving as the research areas were randomly selected through lucky-
dip selection among all the local government areas (LGAs) in each of the selected states. The enumeration areas 
were also randomly selected using the same selection procedures among the list of the Wards that are in each 
LGAs, while another round of systematic sampling involved the selection of households where the heads of each 
of the selected households were chosen for interviews. 
8 Data collected in 2009 were mostly through the use of telephone conversations with some political actors in 
Nigeria, because I was in Germany between October 2008 and October 2009. 
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Some Results 
A Brief Political History of Nigeria in Relation to Ethno-Nationalist Movement: 1900-2009 
Nigeria has about 270 ethnic groups which were ‘wedded’ together to form a British colonial 
State in 1900 and an independent State in 1960. Each of these groups has distinct cultural and 
political identities, separate historical consciousness and different cultural awareness, besides 
several ideological differences. Also, in some areas, although certain groups are somehow 
interlocked with one another, each ethnic group is further demarcated by distinct ecological 
features, which make it possible for different traditional subsistence economies to exist. The 
ecological features range from swampy and coastal terrains to areas with enormous deposits 
of crude oil, which formed the bulk of Nigerian State revenue between early 1970s and 2009. 
This coastal region also engages in intensive aqua-economies such as fishing. Among the 
commonest groups engaged in this trade are the Efik, Ekoi, Ibibio, Oron, Yakuur, Andoni, 
Ogoni, Ijaw, Urhobo, Itsekiri and Ilaje who engage in intensive fishing and many other forms 
of aqua-trading. The southern hinterland located at the lower banks of rivers Niger and Benue 
which naturally divide the country into North and South is dominated by farming peoples 
such as the Igbo, Edo, Yoruba, Tivs, Jukun, Idoma and Igala. The Northern hinterland is 
dominated by the Gwari, Junkun, Hausa, Fulani, Zango, Kataf, Wukari, Takum and Kanuri, 
among others, who combine intensive farming with animal grazing. In terms of hegemonic 
political power, population and geographical spread, there are three dominant ethnic groups in 
Nigeria, namely, the Yoruba, the Igbo and the Hausa/Fulani, with political history claiming 
each of them as hegemonic power in their respective colonial and post-colonial territories.  
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Map 2: A map of Nigeria showing the locations of some of its ethnic groups. 
Source: Ethnic Map of Nigeria, http://www.onlinenigeria.com/mapethnic.asp 
Through the Jihads, the Fulani had conquered almost all other ethnic groups in 
Northern Nigeria.9 Following the success of the 1804 Fulani Jihad, a fusion of Hausa/Fulani 
hegemony was established in Northern Nigeria. Also, in pre-colonial South-western Nigeria, 
the Yoruba, composed of different linguistic groups such as Oyo, Ife, Ijesa, Egba, and Awori, 
among others saw the Oyo group dominating the Yoruba pre-colonial political space between 
the 16th and early 19th centuries10 (Johnson, 1921; Falola and Genova, 2006). On the other 
hand, the Igbo was the dominant ethnic group among the ethnic groups occupying the pre-
colonial South-eastern Nigeria. Each of these three groups (Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo) 
had established its hegemonic power long before colonialism; all of them thus refused to 
relinquish these powers for the interest of the colonial State of Nigeria. Even when the 
country got its independence in 1960, these groups still held on to their differently-conceived 
hegemonic powers, hence creating apprehensions of ethnic domination among themselves.  
                                                            
9 Except the Borno empire in North-eastern Nigeria which successfully repelled the Fulani warriors. 
10 The Oyo Empire was however unable to dominate Ibadan state. 
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Religious differentiation in Nigeria also reflects three distinct religious systems: Islam 
(48%), Christianity (41%), indigenous religious beliefs (9%) and other religions (2%) 
(National Population Commission, 2006). Having secured Nigeria’s independence, the 
differentiation among Nigerian ethnic groups became even more complex as competition for 
both political and economic resources intensified among the groups. Thus, ethno- nationalist 
movement and ethnic politics became instruments for accessing both political and economic 
resources in Nigeria. As the competition often manifested in diverse ways, it can be said that 
nationalism and ethnic politics were expressed in different dimensions, among which the 
political, mythological and violent expressions were dominant.  
In 1960, the country was established as the Federal Republic of Nigeria until 1966 
when it adopted a unitary government. But beside other reasons, the increasing rise of ethno-
nationalist movements, made the country to change back to federalism in 1967 and has 
remained thus till the present, having 36 federating units called states as at August 2009, as 
shown in Map 3 below.  
Map 3: Map of Nigeria showing the thirty six states making up the federal republic 
Source:  Yoruba Nationalism and Ethnic Study, Ethnographic Study Map, 2007. 
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The states are further divided into 774 local administrative units. Between 1966 and 
1979 Nigeria was under military rule headed at different times by an Igbo man (1966), 
Hausa/Fulani (1966-1976) and a Yoruba man (1976-1979). Thereafter, between 1979 and 
1983, there was a democratic government headed by a Hausa/Fulani. This was however 
toppled by another military government, headed by another Hausa/Fulani, which operated 
between 1983 and 1993. There was a planned return to civil rule in 1993, but this was aborted 
by electoral irregularities that led to the annulment of the 1993 federal elections. Between 
August and November 1993, an Interim National Government (ING) was put in place and 
headed by a Yoruba man. The country thereafter fell under another military regime that lasted 
between 1993 and 1999 and was headed by a Hausa/Fulani.  
Since 1999 when the country returned to democratic government, the government has 
faced the daunting tasks of rebuilding a petroleum-based economic nation and 
institutionalizing stable democracy. In addition, between 1999 and 2007, the administration 
headed by Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, who had between 1976 and 1979 headed the country as 
a military head of state, made efforts to defuse longstanding ethnic and religious tensions so 
as to build a sound foundation for economic growth and political stability. Yet, as it was the 
practice during the military regimes, between 1999 and 2008 Nigeria continued to experience 
political hostilities among its various ethnic groups. While the successive governments relied 
on ethnic attachment as an instrument to hang on to power and assert their legitimacy, 
Nigerians also engaged in the use of ethnicity and violence to effect changes in government 
(Maier, 2000). 
The prevailing condition of maintaining a close attachment to ethnic identity therefore 
continues to undermine Nigerian political stability and development. Due to the prolonged 
military rule in Nigeria,11 the country experienced international hostility that reduced its 
national economic growth. Such was the experience between 1993 and 1998 under the 
military headship of General Sanni Abacha. Various Nigerian military governments were 
accused of incapacitating the development of infrastructures (Osaghae, 2004:167). Public 
services such as energy supplies, roads, access to portable water, equitable health care 
services and quality education became inaccessible to many Nigerians, most especially 
between 1983 and 1999. Worsening the situation was the unending political transition which 
the country embarked on between 1987 and 1993.  
                                                            
11 Nigeria witnessed 39 years of military rule within its 48 years of independence as at 2008. Military regimes 
ruled Nigeria between 1966 and 1979 and between 1983 and 1999. 
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The Yoruba of South-western Nigeria who had established a legacy of welfare 
governments during the periods 1950-1966 and 1979-1983 could not endure the socio-
economic hardships that had pervaded the country. Among other means for redress, they re-
emphasized cultural nationalism with which they had engaged the colonial government before 
the 1960s. Most especially, when a general election conducted in 199312 was annulled by the 
then military government, the ideological and cultural attachment they had towards their 
progenitor, Oduduwa, became the weapon with which they fought against their perceived 
political marginalization in Nigeria. 
 
Yoruba in Nigeria: The Creation of an Imagined Community 
Many arguments have been provided for the creation of the Yoruba as a nation, but it is still 
doubtful if the Yoruba community in South-western Nigeria can fit into the context of a 
nation yet. It could be said rather that the Yoruba people in Nigeria are a cultural group that 
has over the years, especially when the conceived and perceived sense of marginalization is 
high, imagined itself as a nation. Since the people are not entirely culturally homogenous, it is 
doubtful if certain elements of a nation exist among them. The Yoruba are made up about 20 
sub-groups which use about eight distinct versions (dialects) of Yoruba languages that are not 
entirely mutually intelligible. While these dialects are often referred to as Yoruba dialects, 
some of them that are not mutually intelligible may be referred to as different languages. 
While it is agreed that all of them belong to the same language group – Kwa division of 
Niger-Kordofanian – some of them like Igbomina, Oyo, Egba, Ilorin, Ibolo, Ijebu and Remo 
among that have higher degree of mutual intelligibility may be regarded as dialects. But some 
others such as Ijesha, Owo, Ondo, Ilaje, Awori among others that are not mutually intelligible 
may not be regarded as dialects.13 The eight distinct languages used in Yoruba territory are: 
1. Oyo with Igbomina, Egba, Ilorin, O’kun and Oke-ogun derivations, mostly used in the 
North, West  and Central parts of the Yoruba land; 
2. Ife spoken in the Central region;  
3. Ijesa spoken in the Central-eastern region; 
4. Ilaje with Ikale, mostly used in the South-eastern region;  
                                                            
12 The election was generally believed to have been won by a Yoruba man, Chief MKO Abiola, but it was 
annulled for many reasons which were deemed illogical and unconvincing by Yoruba people. 
13 This position is subject to further linguistic analysis. 
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5. Ondo with Akoko and Owo derivations spoken in the Eastern region; 
6.  Ekiti spoken in the East-western region; 
7. Ijebu spoken in the South-eastern region;  
8. Egun with Awori derivation spoken in the Southern region.  
Each of these language groups remains largely incomprehensible to the other, 
suggesting the absence of mutual intelligibility.  
On a similar note, it is improbable that the different ethnic sub-groups in Yoruba land 
share the same ancestry, although as the creation of a nation became necessary as a cultural 
and political project there was a creation of history linking all the Yoruba to a common 
ancestry. This historical creation was traced to a Yoruba traditional scriptural text, Ifa, which 
Peel (2008) recently traced to the advent of Islam in Yoruba land.14 In legitimizing this 
appropriated common ancestral history for the Yoruba, Johnson (1921) first made reference to 
the Yoruba people as a community sharing commonalities. While Johnson, as he noted in his 
conclusion, was bothered about ending inter-tribal wars that prevailed among the pre-colonial 
Yoruba, his logical solution to inter-tribal wars was to bind the various Yoruba ‘tribes’ into an 
imagined community. Johnson went further to expound on this: 
But that hope should reign universally, with prosperity and advancement and that the 
disjointed units should all be once more welded into one head from the Niger to the 
coast as in the happy days of ABIODUN, so dear to our fathers, that clannish spirit 
disappear and above all that Christianity should be the principal religion … should be 
the wish and prayer of every true son of Yoruba’ (Johnson, 1921: 642). 
Commonly evidential in Johnson’s book and in books by many other Yoruba 
historians such as Law (1977), Atanda (1997) and Adediran (1998) is the reference to pre-
colonial political competitions among the so-called Yoruba as ‘inter-tribal wars’. If the 
Yoruba saw themselves as one nation, the idea of tribes would not have been in existence. 
Since tribe in the anthropological sense denotes a cultural group with a distinct cultural 
identity encompassing common language, beliefs, aspirations, collective history and ideology 
different from that of others, it is logical to submit that the pre-colonial ‘Yoruba’ was a 
federation of many tribal groups rather than a nation. 
                                                            
14 Peel (2008) recently claimed that Ifa was introduced to the Yoruba people by the early Muslim preachers who 
had contact with the Old Oyo Empire between the 12th and 13th centuries. 
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Similarly, the people did not share common political aspirations and it remains 
contestable even in the 21st century if there is any common political aspiration that is popular 
among the Yoruba. In pre-colonial times, there were numerous kingdoms with similar 
political systems but each one had its autonomy. Similarities in political systems can be 
explained in terms of ecological possibilism which made it possible for the people in those 
Yoruba region to be predominantly engaged in agricultural activities. And as such the people 
had a sedentary population, a state-like political system, a semi-formalized security and a 
political network like the kingship, are probable for political and social orderliness. Thus, the 
pre-colonial Yoruba society featured the Oyo, Ijesa, Ekiti, Egba and Ijaye kingdoms, among 
others. All these kingdoms had kingship institutions which were only necessary for defending 
the land and ensuring a strong political system that could curtail invasion from neighbouring 
tribes. Even at the 21st century, the political events that followed the imagined creation of 
Yoruba as a nation are still short of creating a common political aspiration for the Yoruba 
people as a whole. 
Nonetheless, as ethno-nationalist movements became stronger, consciousness of ethnic 
commonality was established among the Yoruba. This cultural awareness has been traced to 
slavery, Christianity and colonial politics. According to Matory (2005), the Yoruba that were 
exported to Brazil, North America and the West Indies initially noticed among themselves 
that they came from the same port of embankment and that they shared some degree of 
cultural similarity. Hence, they joined together to stage protests against the slave dealers. 
When slavery was aborted, all of them were returned to Sierra Leone where they formed a 
group known as the Creoles. Eventually, they were taken to Lagos in an attempt to re-settle 
them within their cultural origins. Among these new freed slaves were some lucky ones who 
had benefited from Portuguese gestures of Christianity and western education, factors that 
contributed to their becoming the elite of Lagos and Egba. It was these individuals who 
formed the first African clergy in Nigeria. Examples include Samuel Johnson, Samuel Ajayi 
Crowther and Lipede who translated their sense of ethnic commonness into a cultural project.  
This new clergy wanted to translate the English Bible into a local language in order to 
facilitate evangelization in South-western Nigeria. As they were constrained by orthography 
to use, they borrowed from German and Latin alphabets and sounds, with which they 
introduced the writing in Yoruba language with vocalization from the Oyo dialect. These 
early clergymen had their origins from the old Oyo kingdom, and so through them the Oyo 
socio-cultural pattern was made dominant as the expression of common Yoruba values 
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(Atanda, 1997). The establishment of western education which was initially tied to 
Christianity further boosted this agenda. In the schools, Oyo Yoruba was taught and it became 
the official language unifying all the pre-colonial Yoruba groups. Until now, amidst many 
local Yoruba dialects which individual Yoruba are accustomed to when in their local villages, 
Oyo dialect still exists. 
It should be noted that even till the present, the term Yoruba does not exist in Yoruba 
dictionary. Of course, the term was traced to the Hausa word Yar ba (Awde, 1996). According 
to Awde (1996) in his Hausa dictionary, the term Yar ba was used for the Oyo people whom 
the Hausa had the earliest contact with in present-day South-western Nigeria. In Hausa, the 
term is used to refer to a group of people that are smart and clever. In pre-colonial times, 
however, the people now known as the Yoruba in South-western Nigeria were known by their 
distinct tribal names such as Oyo, Ijesa, Ife, Egba, Awori, Igbomina, Ekiti, Remo, Ijebu, Owo, 
Ondo, Ilaje, Egbado, Akoko, Ikale, O’kun, Egun, Yewah and Ilorin. The collective name, 
Yoruba, was never used in reference to these peoples. 
In spite of the above contestations, the Yoruba political elites developed the sense of 
nationalist movements. Among the Yoruba, nationalism was more of a religio-cultural than a 
political project between 1900 and 1940, but from the 1940s it became a political project, 
employing ethnic politics through which the Yoruba people negotiate for more access to State 
resources. Contrary to the earlier spirit of nationalist movement that focused on re-branding 
the Yoruba ideational culture (language and philosophy) and aesthetic values, the later 
movement that was linked with Chief Obafemi Awolowo’s political project assumed the 
Yoruba as a nation that should occupy a central position within the independent Nigerian 
political space, through the political ideology tied to Yoruba ethnicity. In the process of 
pursuing the latter idea of nationalism, the Yoruba re-created the spirit of oneness, which the 
people employed to construct their political essence in the emerging Nigerian post-colonial 
State. There were a multiplicity of factors that contributed to the re-invention and the success 
of ethnic politics that was in form of ethno-nationalist movements. Such factors included the 
role of western education and enlightenment, the nature of Nigerian colonial politics between 
1914 and 1959, the Nigerian post-colonial military regimes and the emergence and increasing 
number of Yoruba political elites. 
Having created the spirit of ethnic politics and ethno-nationalist movements, many 
cultural forces were put in place to create a sense of ethnic belonging among the Yoruba and 
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to influence the Yoruba’s access to political control of the Nigerian federation. Such cultural 
forces include the following: 
1. The creation of tribal socio-cultural associations linked with the Yoruba mythological 
ancestry. Examples are Egbé Ọmọ Odùduwà founded in London in 1948 and launched 
in Nigeria in 1949, Afenifere in 1966 and O’odua Peoples’ Congress in 1995. All 
these groups pursued a Yoruba social, cultural and political agenda. 
2. The use of ethnic politics through ethnic-based political parties, for example, Action 
Group in 1951, Unity Party of Nigeria in 1978 and Alliance for Democracy in 1999. 
3. The use of local genres mostly through media, musical and drama presentations in 
grassroots mobilization in support of ethno-nationalist movements. Examples of the 
music and drama genres included Yoruba Ronu (Yoruba must think) by Hubert 
Ogunde in 1957 and Ka’sora (We should be careful) by I.K Dairo in 1960. There were 
also many other Yoruba musicians who produced home videos and recorded songs 
between 1993 and 2003 expressing Yoruba concerns in Nigeria. Many other Yoruba 
based media outlets expressing Yoruba cause in Nigeria were founded especially 
following the annulment of the June 12th 1993 general elections in Nigeria. All these 
forms of local genres created a broader awareness of the Yoruba people in support of 
ethno-nationalist movements and ethnic politics mostly at the grassroots. 
4. The involvement of Yoruba migrants both in Yoruba cities in Nigeria and abroad in 
support of Yoruba nationalist movements and ethnic politics. For example, following 
the 1993 election annulment Yoruba communities in Texas, London, Berlin and 
Ottawa supported the Yoruba agitations against the Nigerian State. The Yoruba 
community in Texas in particular founded a radio station known as Radio Kudirat 
through which a media war was staged against the military government in Nigeria 
between 1994 and 1997. In addition, in 1999 the Yoruba communities in London and 
Texas financially supported Yoruba ethnic based political parties.   
5. Inclusion of other religions (Islam and traditional religions) and women in Yoruba 
nationalist movement and politics. Before 1993 Yoruba nationalist movements were 
both Christian (Peel, 1989) and male dominated (Nolte, 2008). Starting from the 
establishment of OPC – a pan-Yoruba socio-cultural group that has strong grassroots 
supports – and following the annulment of June 12, 1993 Presidential election, both 
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Yoruba nationalist movement became more interested to many Yoruba irrespective of 
their religions and sexes. 
6. The use of violence as a symbolic characteristic of Yoruba nationalist movement. 
Examples include Operation Wet e in Ibadan in 1964; the 1983 political violence in 
Owo, Akure, Ondo, Ekiti, Osogbo, Offa and Abeokuta; the 1993 political violence in 
protest against the annulment of June 12 elections in nearly all Yoruba towns and 
cities; the 1995-2002 violence by the OPC in Sagamu, Ilorin, Osogbo, Lagos and 
Ibadan; the 2003 violence in Osogbo, Akure and Ekiti; the 2007 violence in Osogbo, 
Ilesa, Ife, Ondo and Ekiti; the 2008 violence in Ondo and Ekiti and the May 2009 
violence in Ekiti state. 
7. Expression of Yoruba political and social marginalization in Nigeria.  
Despite the fact that Awolowo’s project of re-inventing the Yoruba as a nation seemed to be a 
success, it was more of a political project that is still in progress and mostly employed by the 
Yoruba political elite mostly in the progressive political camp to negotiate their inclusion in 
Nigerian political power structures. In support of the above claim is that following 
Awolowo’s repeated failure to be the president of Nigeria, having contested three times (in 
1959, 1979 and 1983) and his eventual death in 1987, the Yoruba nationalist movement based 
on ethnic politics started to decline until the 1992 when another Yoruba, M.K.O Abiola, 
contested and allegedly won the federal elections for presidency in 1993. The elections were 
however annulled, and it sparked off a re-emergence of an active Yoruba nationalist 
movement, this time dominated by Yoruba Muslims and many local tribal groups who saw 
themselves as agents of Yoruba nationalist movement and ethnic politics in Nigeria. Having 
lost the claim to the supposed Yoruba victory of Abiola, many Yoruba ethnic sub-groups 
have, since 1997, turned to provincialism rather than an all-embraced Yoruba national frontier 
of ethno-nationalist movement. 
 
History, Tradition and Modernity in Yoruba Nationalist Movement and Ethnic Politics 
Yoruba history presents a combination of traditions and modernity that worked together to 
account for the people’s culture and civilization. Hence an understanding of the dynamics of 
Yoruba political identity in terms of the ethno-nationalist movement and politics requires 
some sense of longer-range processes, where the roots of many contemporary events of group 
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identity formation, creation of ethno-nationalist movement and the practice of ethnic politics 
can be traced back to some times in the past. As chronicled by scholars such as Shaw (1967), 
Bascom (1969), Shaw and Daniels (1984), Sowunmi (1987) and Atanda (1997), the culture 
and civilization, which the Yoruba people built over 11,000 years ago (Shaw 1967) – even in 
the face of colonial occupation, was their traditional heritage and legacy through which their 
perception of nationalist movement and civil politics was/is constructed. One of the legacies 
of the Yoruba people in the course of development is the people’s pride in the villainy and 
prowess of their progenitor-Oduduwa. Oduduwa is believed to have rescued his people from 
wars and pestilences in the Yoruba pre-historic time. In addition, the people still believe in 
their ancestors, many of whom have been deified as gods and goddesses (Barber, 1981). The 
people also believe that their culture in terms of social, linguistic, political and religious 
systems is richer than that of many other ethnic groups in Nigeria. This perception creates in 
the Yoruba a sense of history arrogating the spirit of political assertiveness and superiority 
over other ethnic groups in the Federation of Nigeria, within which the Yoruba continue to 
influence Nigerian civil politics. The Yoruba belief is that civilization and modern 
development in Nigeria began with the Yoruba people and then spread to other parts. To 
demonstrate this Yoruba perception of patrimonial community, in the early days of Nigerian 
independence, when the country was practicing regional government, the Yoruba region 
scored the legacies of establishing the first television station in Nigeria15 and in Africa and 
one of the first best universities16 in Nigeria. These institutions have statues of Oduduwa’s 
head as their symbols, indicating the Yoruba attachment to traditional belief in Nigeria. Apart 
from the University and the television station, the western regional government under the 
leadership of Chief Obafemi Awolowo (1954-1957), a foremost Yoruba politician, introduced 
more developmental drives that had not been witnessed in Nigeria as at that time. Such 
included the industrialization of the western region in Nigeria, which led to the rapid 
urbanization of the region. Universal free primary education was also introduced. Most of 
these new developments bore the symbols and imagination of Oduduwa personification17 in a 
way that a Yoruba mythological attachment to traditional cultural values is confirmed. 
Through this, the people created and sustained ethnic sentiments in the form of nationalism, 
which eventually led to the creation of ethnic politics in South-western Nigeria. 
                                                            
15 This television station is now called Nigerian Television Authority. 
16 The university was formerly known as University of Ife, but since 1987, its name was changed to Obafemi 
Awolowo University, Ile-Ife. 
17 Personal Interview with Chief Ademuyiwa, in Lagos on 27th May 2004. Chief Ademuyiwa is a Yoruba 
politician in Lagos. 
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As the concept of a Yoruba nation was created from the people’s history and tradition, 
there was also a perceived feeling by the people that they shared commonalities in terms of 
social norms, political goals, cultural heritage and general aspirations. The Yoruba employed 
this feeling to construct a sense of political domination in Nigeria, and an urge to self-
determination as soon as the political domination became unrealizable. Like in many other 
societies, nationalism was constructed around the development of emotional attachment to 
one’s ethnic group (Nyuot yoh, 2005); Yoruba nationalist feeling has to do with the people’s 
conviction of the answer to the question “what is our cultural heritage?” In this context, 
emotional affiliation to a particular “Yoruba nation” is not simply motivated by a concern for 
self-determination, but also by how the people feel about their traditions. In other words the 
Yoruba feelings concerning the people’s cultural heritage and the perception of the Yoruba is 
that Yoruba is a group distinct from other groups in Nigeria, having been scientifically 
validated by archaeological data that the earliest human settlement in the Nigeria dated to 
11,000 years ago was in Yoruba land -Iwo Eleru (Shaw, 1967). The emotional affiliation to 
that feeling, which involves promoting, defending and exerting superiority on other ethnic 
groups in Nigeria and directed towards the creation of an independent State constitutes the 
Yoruba nationalist movement.  
Using ethnic sentiment that was built from history and tradition with new sense of 
what Nigeria ought to be, nationalist movement in Yoruba land expressed the Yoruba political 
aspiration and self-determination. To an average Yoruba person, as expressed by one of the 
respondents in key informant interviews, the Yoruba is “very proud of being a Yoruba, 
because Yoruba has a very rich culture and traditions, vast and richly endowed resources such 
as land for agriculture, ocean and sea. There is also a robust history of civilization that is more 
real than that of many other ethnic groups in Nigeria. All these indicate that the people have 
set the pace of development in Nigeria. Through this, Yoruba people constructed the 
perception that Nigeria needed to be defended by the Yoruba people; or rather Yoruba must 
have more participation in Nigerian government that would allow the Yoruba to change 
Nigerian for better. So many Yoruba people see nothing wrong in defending and translating 
these legacies to power over other people in Nigeria”.18  
Among the people, ethno-nationalism is a process of promoting aspects of their 
traditions and culture as superior, and, perhaps more importantly, promoting the shared 
                                                            
18 Personal interview with an anonymous key informant in Ibadan, June 2007. The key informant was a 
prominent Yoruba politician based in Ibadan. 
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feeling about these heritages. As this attitude is linked with Yoruba historical antecedents the 
people are fond of making reference to their past legacy and desired pride, to the extent of 
protecting such at all cost. As evident from the data generated in survey interview, 78.2% of 
the respondents believe that they would continue to protect the Yoruba past legacy and 
desired pride unflinchingly. This was further supported by 87.3% of the respondents affirming 
that even if it leads to the laying down of their lives they would continue to protect and defend 
Yoruba traditions and culture. 
From their sense of cultural pride as noted above, the Yoruba constructed a distinct 
identity, and in conjunction with the process of group identity formation certain cultural pride 
is often expressed. Hence, ethnic identity among the Yoruba people is subjective to the extent 
that it denotes specific Yoruba historical, cultural and linguistic traits that distinguish the 
people from other ethnic groups. A popular belief among the Yoruba was endorsed by 15.5% 
of the respondents who asserted that Yoruba people are distinct from other ethnic groups in 
terms of their language. The belief is that the Yoruba language is still more original and richer 
in proverbs and idioms than other languages in Nigeria where such linguistic traits are absent 
– a claim that lacks empirical validation. The Yoruba language, according to a respondent, has 
so many dialects, some of which share mutual intelligibility in terms of meanings.19  Drawn 
from the people’s assertion that Yoruba land is the cradle of civilization in Nigeria, statements 
such as “Ibi Ojúmó ń tí mó wá” meaning the source of life are often expressed in relation to 
Yoruba. This view dominated the opinions of 50.7% of the key informants mostly from Oyo 
and Osogbo. The respondents from Ife and Osogbo also asserted that Ife, which is the 
ancestral home of the Yoruba, is the cradle of civilization. According to the Yoruba people, 
Ife has the earliest invention of textile, iron smelting and casting, carving, and a centralized 
political system. Osogbo, another historical town in Yoruba region, is referred to as the 
“Osun” meaning the city of living spring. Similarly, as reflected in the survey interview, 
39.3% of the respondents believe that the Yoruba pride is also evident in Yoruba traditional 
political history, which is characterized by events leading to the formation of many traditional 
kingdoms aspiring to form a state society. Corroborating this notion of Yoruba pride is also 
the Yoruba political history that featured expansionist activities and resentment against unjust 
governments, even against the colonial government.20 While many of these claims are 
supported by historical and archaeological evidence, the beliefs of people give subjective 
credence to identity formation, in the face of cultural relativity.  
                                                            
19  Personal interview with Pa Emmanuel Alayande in Ibadan on March 15, 2005. 
20 Personal interview with Lawuyi Tunde in his house in Osogbo on April 27, 2004. 
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All the above form the spectrum of ethno-nationalist movement among the Yoruba 
and prove that ethnic sensitivity and sentiments among the Yoruba are not recent 
developments. It was believed to have started a long time ago. A leader of the O’odua 
People’s Congress made the following statement about ethno-nationalist movement in Yoruba 
land: “You can infer from the history of the Yoruba, which I just told you. You can see that 
the spirit of ethno- nationalist movement has always being the alter ego of the Yoruba people 
right from the origin of the people. At first it was “tribal” sensitivity as an internal affair, but 
later with the amalgamation of 1914, the struggle extended to cultural nationalism and beyond 
internal. Presently, I can say it is a national political force.”21 Historically, Yoruba cultural 
consciousness can be phased into three main epochs. These are the pre-colonial, colonial and 
post-colonial/ transitional.  
During the pre-colonial era, the course was tribal sensitivity, which was an internal 
process. It has to do with each of the Yoruba (tribes) kingdoms trying to exert influence over 
the other. The process involved internal warfare employed as a means of power negotiation 
and domination, even among the individuals in a particular kingdom. It was this process that 
marked the creation of Yoruba mythological hegemonic power associated with Oduduwa who 
negotiated for power and eventually emerged as a dominating political force. During the 
colonial era, Yoruba nationalist movement took a different dimension. Then, it was based on 
literary production featuring the attempt to (re) write the Yoruba literature in Yoruba (Oyo 
dialect) language, and pursuing Yoruba historical agenda (Barber, 1989). The Yoruba elite 
group seemed to have established an imagined Yoruba community called a nation. Nationalist 
movement at this time was aimed at making various Yoruba groups into recognizing the fact 
that they all belonged to an indivisible community. It was at this time that the myth of the 
origin and authority of the Yoruba became very dominant, especially the myth of Oduduwa as 
a unifying force among the Yoruba. Later, this ‘passive’ nationalist movement was translated 
into group action by the newly emerging Yoruba political elite class with people such as 
Herbert Macaulay and Obafemi Awolowo who spearheaded cultural movements and political 
parties that were Yoruba-based.22 These individuals aimed at fortifying various Yoruba 
interests into a common force targeted at re-claiming the Yoruba identity that had been lost to 
European missionary establishments and colonialism. Nationalist movement thus became a 
question of the revival and restoration of Yoruba tradition and a true Yoruba identity in terms 
                                                            
21 Personal interview with Chief Gani Adams in Lagos on 26th May 2004. Chief Gani Adams was the factional 
leader of O’odu Peoples’ Congress (OPC) as at 2009. OPC is a Yoruba militant socio-cultural group founded in 
1995.   
22 Oyo prof. 23 file no c42, Yoruba Politics in Lagos. Ibadan, National Archives Ibadan, Vol. 42. 
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of language, customs, traditions and dressing. It was more about ethnic superiority, laying 
claim that the Yoruba people had a distinct culture, territory and system of production and 
that they had been conducting their affairs independently for a long time, even dealing 
diplomatically with neighbouring groups. 
The exit of the colonial masters, beginning from the late 1950s, marked a change of 
order in Yoruba nationalist movement. Between that time and the early 1960s, the historical 
consciousness drawn from the Oduduwa legacy as a cultural object had started to fade at the 
insurgence of intense competition on Yoruba political space between the Yoruba and the 
Igbo. This notwithstanding, the emerging Yoruba nationalists capitalized on the same 
sentiment to establish agencies of nationalist movements such as the Egbé Omo Odùduwà, 
which was established in 1949 and later a political party (Action Group) in 1951.23 Action 
Group later served as platforms for the ethnic politics that was dominant in Nigerian newly 
independent political system. As noted above Awolowo, a Yoruba nationalist, used the 
platforms to introduce a new phase of infrastructural development in the Yoruba region, and 
by extension in Nigerian politics. Such developments were translated to cultural pride, which 
made and still make the Yoruba people feel that they are superior to others. They also feel that 
if they are left alone to control their resources, they could manage the resources better. They 
feel that they are in a position to define their own mission and future and to show directions to 
other ethnic groups in Nigeria.   
Unlike in the other two periods, the use of violence and militarism for nationalist 
purposes was dominant during the post-colonial (transitional) period. Firstly, the political riot 
of 1964-65, tagged Operation wet e was a resistance against the imposition of the perceived 
Hausa/Fulani political agenda on the Yoruba people. Following this was the Àgbékòyà crisis 
of 1968 which was ignited by strong resentment against the slashing of cocoa prices by the 
Federal Government of Nigeria, which resentment was expressed through violent actions. 
Cocoa was regarded as the Yoruba chief economic resource, just as groundnuts and palm oil 
were to the Hausa/Fulani and Igbo in Northern and Eastern Nigeria, respectively. The 
resentment stemmed from the fact that the “Yoruba could not understand why the purchasing 
price of cocoa should be slashed and the same decree was not extended to groundnuts and 
palm oil’.”24 The Yoruba explanation of the situation was that since the funding for 
developmental projects in the Yoruba region accrued from the proceeds on cocoa, the Federal 
                                                            
23 Tell Magazine, April 30th, 2001. 
24 Daily Times, September 25th, 1972. 
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Government of Nigeria intended to cripple the development of the Yoruba “nation”. Thus, a 
violent resistance in the form of nationalist movement was triggered. The Agbekoya period 
marked the era of military governments in Nigeria whose various leaders were Hausa/Fulani 
extractions. Thus, the Yoruba people then always contrived socio-political marginalization, 
which they often blamed on the centralization of power characteristic of the military 
governments back then.25  
The postcolonial or transitional period represents the mainstream of Yoruba cultural 
consciousness, which is partly ideological. This time, the definition of nationalism is 
economic and political. It is not based on the notion of otherness but on access to the control 
of resources which the Yoruba people are supposedly entitled to, but denied by over-
centralization of Nigerian political system that continue to justify inequitable access to 
Nigerian political power. Thus, as Yoruba feel more affected the historical consciousness 
about Oduduwa (the Yoruba progenitor) and other forms of cultural pride built into Yoruba 
identity are not only recreated but re-directed more strongly towards nationalist projects such 
as protecting Yoruba cultural resources, correcting injustice, fighting social alienation and 
combating political marginalization which the Yoruba experienced within the State of 
Nigeria.26 From the desire to control what the Yoruba were supposedly entitled to, springs 
renewed ideas of ethno-nationalist movements that has shifted from the colonial perspective 
which defined nationalism purely in cultural terms to restructuring of the Nigerian political 
and economic system that will fit into the framework of an imagined Yoruba nation. The 
nationalists’ idea moved from an emphasis on literary production to self-determination and 
the actualization of Yoruba control of Nigeria. The concept of an imagined nation is construed 
in two senses: first, as the newly independent Nigeria, and secondly as the possible sovereign 
Yoruba nation – Odua Republic (a tentative name for an imagined nation) that will emerge 
should the independent Nigeria fail. Thus, the interest is vested on controlling huge resources 
and committing such to building the contemplated Yoruba nation, and competing with other 
ethnic groups in Nigeria for the control of national resources. 
Since 1964 till 2009 Yoruba nationalist movements featured the use of violence. Up 
till 2009, the Yoruba of South-western Nigeria involved in a number of political violence, 
often linked to the ethnic-based political relationship among many ethnic groups that 
characterized Nigerian politics. The notable examples of such violence in Yoruba land 
                                                            
25 Tell Magazine, November 15th, 2001. 
26 Personal interview with Lawuyi Tunde in Osogbo on September 13, 2005. 
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included operation wet e (1964-1966), Àgbékòyà crisis27 (1968) in Ibadan, political violence 
caused by election rigging in the then Oyo and Ondo states in 1983 and the 1993 violence 
caused by the annulment of June 12, 1993 general elections. Many other crises in reactions to 
Yoruba perceived marginalization in Nigeria were instigated by O’odua People’s Congress 
(OPC)28 in Ibadan, Lagos, Sagamu, Osogbo and Ilorin among other Yoruba cities between 
2002 and 2005. Other incidence of violence included election violence in Ekiti and Osun 
States following the 2007 general elections and the 2009 violent reactions in some towns and 
villages in Ekiti state due to the accusation of election frauds that characterized the re-run 
governorship election in the state. All the above cases of violence bore the expressions of 
certain Yoruba discontents against Nigerian political and economic structures. Occurrence of 
this violence during general elections in Nigeria suggests that a tight competition always 
exists in political power struggles among some ethnic groups that constitute the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria. 
Power struggle assumes different forms of conflicts, which democratic governance 
needs to manage through electoral principles and rule of law; rather, in Nigerian case since 
1960, when the country got independence, many of its political elites have appropriated the 
gains of democracy to build ethnic-based political hegemony and caused violence whenever 
their political aspirations were frustrated. The Yoruba in particular often accused 
Hausa/Fulani political elites in Nigeria of dominating Nigerian federal political power for a 
long time through which the Hausa/Fulani have caused political marginalization of the 
Yoruba people. When their attempts to redress the situation through elective politics were 
frustrated by election riggings, Yoruba political elites engaged in violent political struggles 
usually instigated by Yoruba-based political parties and socio-cultural groups that constituted 
nationalist movements. As the political violence mostly occurred when Yoruba candidates 
were defeated in national presidential elections, it suggests that the Yoruba nationalists were 
agitating for more political power in Nigeria. Many of these crises have sent thousands of the 
people to their deaths and seriously reduced the tempo of development not only in Yoruba 
                                                            
27 Although Àgbékòyà Crisis was more of peasant/state agitation, but the undertone and the state perception was 
that it was an expression of Yoruba nationalism against the State. 
28 O’odua People’s Congress (OPC) is a militant pan-Yoruba socio-cultural organization founded in 1994 by 
Fredrick Fasheun, a medical doctor and former presidential aspirant on the platform of the defunct Social 
Democratic Party (SDP) in Nigerian 1993 election. He joined with a group of Yoruba intellectuals including 
Beko Ransome-Kuti, another medical doctor and human rights activists who became the national treasurer, and 
Ganiyu Adams who was the head foot soldiers.  According to an OPC leader in Osogbo, “initially the major 
source of its resistance was the annulment of June 12 presidential elections, and the need for Yoruba unity as a 
prelude to an “Oduduwa Republic. Between 1995 and 2008 OPC had instigated many violent crises in almost all 
the major Yoruba towns and cities where their objects of attack were Hausa/Fulani and institutions of Federal 
Government in Yoruba land. 
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communities but in entire Nigeria. Infrastructure such as houses, roads, offices and even 
hospitals are constantly under threat due to political violence.  
From the above account, it can be deduced that the combination of tradition and 
modernity re-awakened Yoruba nationalist movement through the colonial to post-colonial 
period. On the part of tradition, the Yoruba continued their attachment to traditional values, 
and the legitimization of the people’s self-constructed ethnic commonalities as group identity, 
which grew from being a cultural to a political project, and used as political instrument in 
negotiating for the political control of Nigeria. On the other hand, Yoruba access to western 
education and a colonial system of administration which however denied its educated elite’s 
inclusion in the British colonial government, and more importantly the people’s exposure to 
Christianity triggered a more intensified spirit of nationalist movement and the practice of 
ethnic politics. The consequence of all these multiple agencies of change was that the Yoruba 
became the catalyst influencing political change in Nigerian politics. Being exposed to all the 
above features that characterized both the colonial and post-colonial socio-political space in 
which Yoruba territory is situated, the Yoruba people continued to complain against both the 
colonial and military governments that subjected them to cultural devaluation, political 
repression, and economic deprivation in the Nigerian political community.29 The people, 
especially the new Yoruba political elite, felt that they were not sufficiently included in 
government, and thus resorted to the use of Yoruba traditional values, cultural and political 
prides as instrumental forces to draw support from the grassroots people and to fight against 
the perceived marginalization of the Yoruba by the state.  
 
III. The Dynamics of Yoruba Politics and Nationalist Movement:  
Implications for Nigerian Politics and the State 
Yoruba nationalist movement engendered political changes within its space and such changes 
have implications for Nigerian national politics and the State as a whole. This suggests that 
change is a cultural action which is not devoid of consequences that may be either positive or 
negative. Such consequences may have the capacity of affecting a territorial space far beyond 
the space in which the change is initiated. In the context of Yoruba politics and nationalism, 
the initiated changes have far reaching implications on Nigerian national politics in such a 
                                                            
29 Personal interview with Pa Emanuel Alayande in Ibadan, May 25th, 2005. 
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way that many of its resultant effects have become legacies which Nigerian polities have 
contended and still contend with for many years, as will be discussed below.  
The political strength of Yoruba nationalist movement was the Egbé Omo Odùduwà 
founded in 1949 and transformed into a political party known as Action Group (AG) in 1951. 
The party dominated the politics of the western region between 1954 and 1957 after which it 
lost some of its seats in the Western Regional House of Assembly to the National Congress of 
Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), due to intra-party squabbles that undermined its strength. The 
crisis initially erupted in Ibadan which is regarded as the political power house of the western 
region (that is, the Yoruba political space). The Action Group reclaimed some of the political 
seats during the 1964 federal elections in post-colonial Nigeria and thereafter continued to 
maintain its political hegemony of the western region till the military incursion into Nigerian 
politics in 1966. In 1979, when the ban on political associations was lifted, it was the Yoruba 
led by Late Obafemi Awolowo who first announced the creation of a political party, Unity 
Party of Nigeria (UPN), still formed on the basis of ethnic affiliation, as many of its principal 
functionaries were bulked up by mainly Yoruba politicians. The party, like the Action Group, 
did not win enough political seats outside the Yoruba political space. Following the Yoruba 
example, since the 1950s other major ethnic groups in Nigeria have established political 
parties to strengthen their ethno-nationalist movement. For instance, the Northern Elements 
People’s Union (NEPU) represented the interests of the minority ethnic groups in Northern 
Nigeria, while the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) catered for the interests of the core 
Northern ethnic groups (the Hausa/Fulani), with the National Congress of Nigerian Citizens 
(NCNC) becoming the political medium for Igbo nationalist movement between the 1950s 
and 1960s. 
From the 1980s onwards, while other ethnic-based political associations such as the 
National Party of Nigeria (NPN), Nigerian People’s Party (NPP) in 1979, People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP) and All Nigerians People’s Party (ANPP) in 1999 started to reflect 
national coverage and patronage, the Yoruba-based political associations like the Unity Party 
of Nigeria (UPN) between 1979 and 1983 and Alliance for Democracy (AD) between 1999 
and 2008 failed to appeal to other ethnic groups in Nigeria. As in the 50s and 60s, the Yoruba 
conception of party formation, even in the 21st century, largely reflects socio-ethnic 
fragmentation. The Alliance for Democracy (AD), a Yoruba political party formed in 1998, 
featured ideologies similar to those of the AG and UPN which were initially founded by the 
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Yoruba politicians in the progressive political camp. Between 1998 and 2003, AD also acted 
as the Yoruba political force for ethno-nationalist movement in South-western Nigeria. 
The formation of political parties along ethnic lines created real tensions among ethnic 
groups, which were often expressed independently of national political interests. The political 
elites across Nigeria created mutual distrust among the competing communities and harnessed 
political power via political violence based on ethnic subjectivity. The tensions were 
perpetuated even beyond the civil political space, as military governments in Nigeria have 
also featured spates of violence typical of ethnic tensions. As such incidences become more 
prominent in the Yoruba political space, instigated by Yoruba nationalist movement, the 
Yoruba infected the national politics with ethnic politics and violence. On many occasions, 
Yoruba violent nationalist movements have led to fundamental shifts in power in the Nigerian 
political landscape.   
During the colonial and post-colonial eras, the changes introduced in Nigerian politics 
through Yoruba nationalist movement caused major constitutional shifts in Nigerian national 
politics. From 1920 to date, various constitutional and political developments have come 
about at the instances of Yoruba nationalist movement. The 1946 constitutional change was 
due to Yoruba political dissatisfactions against the 1922 Clifford Constitution which the then 
Yoruba elite criticized due to the poor representation of its members in the colonial 
government at the time. The 1922 Clifford Constitution was thus replaced with the 1946 
Richard Constitution. This constitution however also crumbled as a result of quantified 
franchise granted by the constitution which disenfranchised many of the Yoruba political elite 
and thus limited their access to political power. It was this and many other flaws inherent in 
the Richard Constitution that led to its amendment and ultimate replacement with the 1951 
McPherson Constitution. Still, the federalism which the 1951 Constitution granted Nigeria 
was not satisfactory to the Yoruba political elites as the newly colonial federated Nigeria was 
defined as a mere geographical expression (Awolowo, 1947). The Yoruba therefore put their 
machinery of nationalist movement into force, relying on the strong determination of several 
socio-cultural and political groups to change the constitution. This provoked a widespread 
agitation for self-government which was achieved for the Southern Protectorate in 1954 and 
for the Northern Protectorate in 1957. As from 1957, the political heat generated by the 
Yoruba made the colonial government uncomfortable and the British parliament had to grant 
Nigeria independence in 1959. Thus, Nigeria became fully independent in 1960. 
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The independent government was formed by a coalition that excluded the Yoruba 
politicians in the progressive camp from national politics, partly because of Yoruba ethnic 
politics and partly because of the unwillingness of the Yoruba political leader, Chief Obafemi 
Awolowo, to work with “less comparable political elites from Northern Nigeria” (Awolowo, 
1970) who constituted the national government in 1960. The Yoruba posed stiff opposition 
against the national government, which put the first post-colonial civilian government on its 
toes to have performed fairly creditable between 1960 and 1966. However, as the government 
led by Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) political party engaged in electoral fraud in 1964 
general elections in Nigeria, the Yoruba politicians in the progressive camps mostly in AG 
party instigated violent political crises that eventually resulted in the termination of the 
republic through a military coup on January 15th, 1966. The political crisis in western Nigeria 
tagged operation wet e (1964-1965) similarly marked the beginning of violent ethnic politics 
in Nigeria. This incidence of political violence has continued to mar Nigerian democratic 
development, as it re-occurred in 1983 and 1993 following the political swindling of the 
Yoruba politicians by the Hausa/Fulani political hegemony, leading to a military take-over. 
The consequences of such incidences include the loss of a sense of legitimacy on the part of 
the Nigerian ruling government, widespread political violence and abrupt changes in 
government such as those experienced by the Shagari government in 1983 and Shonekan’s 
Interim National Government (ING) in 1993. 
An attempt to continue the legitimization of political hegemony in Nigeria by the 
Nigerian political oligarchy led to the annulment of a general election conducted on June 12th, 
1993 in Nigeria. Despite the fact that the oligarchy defies ethnic and religious divides, many 
Yoruba saw the annulment as a political manipulation by the Hausa/Fulani to keep their hold 
on political hegemony in Nigeria. Since the election was believed to have won by a Yoruba 
man, its annulment was perceived by the Yoruba as a ‘rape’ of their political consciousness, 
and this created political misgivings which lasted between 1993 and 1998. During this period, 
the whole country experienced political crises that led to serious economic and political 
declines. The political landscape was characterized by assassinations, widespread political 
violence and ethnic confrontations. The Yoruba in their nationalistic consciousness formed 
many socio-cultural associations such as the O’odua Peoples’ Congress (OPC), Afenifere, 
Yoruba Council of Elders (YCE) and Alajobi, all linked together by a common Yoruba 
identity and ancestry (Arifalo, 2001:213). All these groups perceived the political contrivance 
and affront as unbearable and thus re-created the Yoruba struggles against political 
marginalization. This new development in Yoruba politics diffused to other parts of Nigeria 
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as many militant socio-cultural groups representing varied interests emerged in different 
places. As at 2009, militant groups in Nigeria spread across Nigeria and remain countless, 
albeit the most popular include the Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA), Movement of the 
Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), the Niger Delta Volunteer Force and Chikoko 
Movement representing the Niger-Delta fighting against their ecological and economic 
deprivations; the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) 
represents the Igbo ethno-nationalist movements; and the Arewa Youths Consultative Forum 
(AYCF) representing the Hausa/Faulani nationalist interests. These groups are contesting not 
only for the political space in Nigeria and the gains of democracy denied them by military 
governments prior to civilian democracy but also for the social and economic spaces as part of 
the liberalization of the political movement (Ajala, 2008a). The Yoruba pressures on the 
government in protest against their political marginalization led to the transfer of power to 
civilian government by the military government in 1999 and subsequent call for a Sovereign 
National Conference – a call for the dialogue among all the ethnic groups in Nigeria to 
discuss the principles and practice of Nigerian federalism. The call was/is spearheaded by 
Yoruba political activists who are of progressive political ideology.30 
The spate of ethno-nationalist movement ironically appears to be what has unified 
Nigerians in political combat. Rather than lauding the efforts to get the State to function 
effectively after about thirty years of deleterious military rule, Nigerians generally have 
continued to express a lack of faith in the government and in the rule of law through ethnic 
militancy introduced into Nigerian politics by Yoruba nationalist movement. While all ethnic 
groups in Nigeria share a sense of oppression and denial of fair and equal access to both 
political and economic resources in the country, the Yoruba believe that should their 
politicians in the progressive political camp be conferred with federal power, such political 
misappropriations would seize. So, to many Yoruba, the only way out of the political 
quagmire is violent ethno-nationalist movement since the people’s political wish could not be 
guaranteed in view of their progressive politicians often been denied more inclusion in 
Nigerian central government. This stands is in opposition to the project of consolidating 
democracy which involves the internalization of rules governing the exercise of power, the 
ensuring of free and fair electoral contests, the equitable control of resources by all ethnic 
groups and the resolution of disputes through court system. Since the incidence of operation 
wet e of 1964 in western Nigeria, cases of extreme militancy in Nigerian politics have become 
                                                            
30  As at July 2009, Nigerian government is yet to accede to this call, despite the fact that the groups calling for it 
is persistent in the call since 1995. 
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a national occurrence, causing the wanton destruction of lives and property characteristic of 
agitation against electoral frauds in Nigeria. Ethnic militancy has also led to the destruction of 
strategic infrastructure such as energy supply, oil and gas facilities across the country, to the 
extent that the national economic development is often put on hold. 
The political ideology – Awoism – developed from the political ideas of Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo, the foremost Yoruba politician (1907-1987), became the hallmark of 
performance in government not only in the western region but in the entire Nigeria. The 
ideology was enunciated in the western region in 1951 and practically demonstrated in the 
Action Group (AG) administration of the region between 1954 and 1964; and similarly 
adopted in the region between 1979 and 1983. With Awoism, emphasis was placed on 
discipline, good performance and strict compliance with the rules of the political game. In this 
concept, the above qualities were regarded as recipes for good government. The concept 
emphasized adherence to the principle of rules of law in constitutional democracy. That is, the 
government had to abide by the constitution, which Awolowo regarded as the will of the 
people. To him, running a government was a social contract, and at any time when the 
government no longer fulfilled its own parts of the deal, the people had recourse to terminate 
the contract (Awolowo, 1970). 
This political ideology (Awoism) deconstructs social inequality on the basis of certain 
forms such as religion and economic background. In Awoism, appointment to political 
positions was not based on religious and cultural linings; rather it was based on who has 
outstanding credibility to perform in government, irrespective of religious and cultural 
positions. For instance, Obafemi Awolowo would not entrust anybody noted for extra-marital 
affairs with public political function that has to do with public resources management, 
because to Awolowo, such a person is indiscipline and capable of using public funds to 
manage his extra marital affairs (Awolowo, 1970). However, Awolowo recognized inequality 
based on age and intellectual capacity (Awolowo, 1960). Hence, to reduce the impact of this 
inequality on the Yoruba people and in Nigeria as a whole, Awoism, being one of the positive 
impacts of Yoruba nationalist movement considers access to western education as primus 
inter pares (Ajala, 2008b). One is therefore left with little doubt as to the reasons behind the 
vigour and zeal for free education, which was the cardinal political project of Awoist 
governments in Yoruba society. The project has since become the Yoruba political image in 
Nigeria, to the extent that any government wanting to control the masses must entrench free 
education in its political manifestoes. This further explains why in 1978, at the constitutional 
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drafting committee in Nigeria, Awolowo vigorously pushed arguments for the entrenchment 
of fundamental principles and objective policies of the government, which later became 
chapter 2 of the 1979 constitution, and since then it has continued to appear in subsequent 
Nigerian constitutions. Top most among the features of this constitutional provision was 
public access to basic education and health care. Although another clause of the constitution 
(section 6(6) c)31 makes it difficult for the provisions to be enforceable by the people, they 
have become constitutional drives towards the establishment of Nigeria as a welfare state, as 
embodied in Awoism – the cardinal principle of Yoruba nationalist movement. 
 
Conclusion 
From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that Yoruba nationalist movement and ethnic 
politics are complex and unique, as they act as forces of culture change in Nigerian politics, 
reflecting the multi-dimensional nature of traditional elements and modernity. Relying on 
their history that form the basis for traditional cultural values and prides, the Yoruba people of 
South-western Nigeria construct a socio-cultural ego flexing ethno-nationalist movement of 
wanting to gain more control of both the political and economic resources in Nigeria. The 
historical consciousness of the Yoruba people, their perceived long years of being politically 
marginalized and the arbitrariness they associated with the control and distribution of national 
resources in Nigeria, were used by the Yoruba progressive political elite to incite Yoruba 
consciousness of self-determination in Nigeria. In addition, the exposure of the emergent 
political elite to western education, Christianity, colonialism, and military government in 
Nigeria gave the Yoruba elite the impetus to instigate the Yoruba masses against the State and 
other Nigerian ethnic groups, especially against the Hausa/Fulani people. Throughout the 
colonial and postcolonial periods, the Yoruba people have relied on their sense of nationalist 
movement to effect change not only within the Yoruba socio-political space, but also within 
the entire Nigerian political landscape.  
Apart from effecting social change and impacting on the State action, Yoruba 
nationalist movement and ethnic politics seem to be the creation of the Yoruba political elite 
mostly in the progressive political camp. And as time changes and the competition for control 
of State resources in Nigeria becomes more intense, the use of nationalism and ethnic politics 
                                                            
31 Section 6 (6) (c) of the 1979 Nigerian Constitution makes the provisions of the Chapter 2 of the same 
constitution unenforceable, because this section of the section prohibits the public from challenging the failure of 
the government to implement the provisions of chapter 2 of the constitution.  Yet these provisions (chapter 2 of 
Nigerian Constitution) have continued to appear in subsequent Nigerian constitutions since 1979 to date. 
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also assume different foci. Such foci from the 1900s to 2009 included the construction of 
ethnic commonality, colonial political instrument for more inclusion in British colonial 
government and independence from colonialism, equitable access to federal political power, 
restructuring of Nigerian lopsided federalism in such a way that more power is acceded to the 
federating units in Nigeria and among others democratically fair and free election. It therefore 
becomes improbable that the Yoruba people in Nigeria are interested in carving out their own 
independent State from the present Nigerian political map. Hence, Yoruba nationalist 
movement remains a construct of Yoruba traditional values driven by elements of 
modernization aimed at producing political change that can better place the Yoruba political 
elite within the mainstream of Nigerian political power. It is also a re-creation of political 
culture in the name of preserving the people’s traditional identity, forging new identities and 
using those identities in power relations with other groups in Nigeria. Hence, traditions, 
history, and Yoruba socio-political space become cultural agencies that act as forces of 
political change in Nigeria.  
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